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Understanding The Recurrent Crisis In Legal 
Romanticism: Two Criteria for Coherent Doubt 
Chris Sagers∗ 
 
Abstract 
 
 Broadly skeptical or relativistic criticisms of law and 
legal discourse, of the kind prevalent in the last generation in 
American legal scholarship, pose an inherent logic problem: 
they tend to impugn normativity itself just as much as they do 
their intended target. What seems amiss is that the act of 
critique is itself normative. However it is stated, and 
notwithstanding efforts by the critic to say otherwise, it is hard 
to see how the normativity implied in the very act of critique—
indeed, in the very act of having purposes at all—is not at odds 
with the critique itself. 
 As an organizing theme, this paper observes a parallel 
in the history of a much more influential intellectual movement, 
the “romantic” phase in nineteenth century literature. While 
no one seems to have noticed the striking similarities between 
that movement and our recent generation of legal iconoclasm, 
the lesson is that the conflict latent in this work is destined to 
lead only to ever more mystical, seemingly desperate efforts to 
explain how one can be both a productive legal academic and 
be a skeptic. As the romantic experience suggests, that cycle  
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sooner or later ends when plausibility is exhausted and the 
winds of academic fashion turn elsewhere. But the more 
central contribution of the paper is a technical one. It will 
carefully model the internal logic conflict itself, and then 
devise a means logically to test whether various likely and 
widely held scholarly purposes could, under this test, resolve 
the conflict. Ultimately, this paper is something of a confession 
of one doubter that apparently there is no solution to this 
conflict. 
 
Hume, and other sceptical innovators, are vain men, and will 
gratify themselves at any expense. . . . Truth, sir, is a cow 
which will yield such people no more milk, and so they are 
gone to milk the bull. 
 
—Samuel Johnson 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 It was apparently never much appreciated among those 
brash legal iconoclasts who enjoyed so much attention in the last 
forty years or so, nor among all we who shared their sympathies, 
that latent at the heart of their project was an ancient logic 
problem. At length it would cause the temporarily glamorous 
project to fade from academic fashion and for the time being seem 
to have been defeated. It is evidently not now appreciated by their 
many critics that, sooner or later, they will be back. Lessons from 
history suggest that while that ancient logic problem is a hard and 
dispiriting one that causes doubtful movements periodically to 
fade, they do not disappear. Revolutionary critique, on the one 
hand, and received culture, on the other hand, are often conceived 
as locked in a zero-sum struggle, and as a matter of academic fad 
one or the other may seem at a given time to be in ascendency. 
Somehow the struggle can be played out and forgotten fairly 
quickly, and the fact that the recent struggle in law finds close 
ancestors from so long ago will turn out to be quite telling.2 
                                                
1 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 314 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980) 
(1763) (quoting Samuel Johnson). 
2 This insight resembles in very small form that made by sociologist Randall 
Collins in his massive world history of philosophy. He recounts the recurrence 
of skeptical arguments throughout recorded history and in a variety of cultures, 
and argues that they are a particular aspect of the process by which “critical 
epistemologies” cyclically interact with ever more abstract metaphysics. See 
RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF 
INTELLECTUAL CHANGE 807-13 (1998). 
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 The ancient problem of logic is as follows. Skepticism—
the epistemological position that we do not or cannot know things 
in an objective sense—or morally relative critiques, or other 
approaches implying broad doubt of values, have a way of painting 
themselves into a corner. In its simplest version, the logic conflict 
is simply that one cannot assert as a matter of fact either that there 
is no truth or that it is impossible to know things. Both statements 
are self-contradictory.3 In that version the problem is easy to 
evade—a person can be earth-scorchingly skeptical without 
explicitly stating propositions whose truth is required.4 But even 
more careful statements of doubt eventually tend to work 
themselves back into the same problem, and one purpose here is to 
show that that is indeed the case. When worked out to their logical 
conclusions, they tend to cast doubt on normativity itself. The 
problem then is that critique, by its nature, is itself normative.5 
Legal philosophy must ask how one can be both a doubter and 
continue to speak or write anything at all. More to the point, how 
can one be both a doubter and a law professor, a person whose 
vocation is normally thought to require evaluation of things? Here 
is a cold, honest, and unflattering confession: though I have spent 
more than ten years thinking about it, and despite my instinct that 
it is not insoluble, I am afraid I do not know.6 Indeed, this paper 
                                                
3 Aristotle observed this; the statements assert their own truth, an assertion that 
the statements themselves say cannot be made. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, 
bk. I , ch. 4, at 59-64 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., Peripatetic Press 1979).  
4 While epistemological skeptics seem to assert that “we cannot know anything,” 
and therefore to refute themselves, they need not make that strong claim just to 
be skeptical. The skeptic can just claim that “it seems like I do not know 
anything for sure,” and, after all, de gustibus non est disputandum. See 
Christopher L. Sagers, Waiting With Brother Thomas, 46 UCLA L. REV. 461, 
462 n.3, 484-86 (1998) [hereinafter Sagers, Waiting]. The ancient skeptics, 
following Pyrrho of Elis, made this argument at great length, claiming that their 
only purpose was to retreat to the calm of an inner state of refusal to decide 
anything at all (the state of “epoche” or έποχή). See SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 
OUTLINES OF SKEPTICISM 10 (Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1994); JONATHAN BARNES, THE TOILS OF SCEPTICISM 8-9 (1990) 
(explaining the use of έποχή in Sextus and ancient skepticism).  
 Still, it turns out the even the totally Pyrrhonian skeptic has an internal 
logic conflict like other doubters; it just takes a more elaborate argument to see 
why. See infra Part IV(9). 
5
 See Christopher L. Sagers, Student Book Review, Postmodern Legal 
Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End, By Gary Minda, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1938-42 (1997) (critical of Minda for failure even to 
acknowledge the normativity ironically implied in his book). See also Arthur 
Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L. J. 1229 (1979). 
6 James Boyle put it this way: “[T]he trouble with confronting really hard 
problems is that you probably won't be able to solve them. As different drafts of 
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resurrects the tortured palimpsest of an optimistic manuscript on 
the question called Cum Grano Salis,7 later scaled back in 
ambition and renamed The Identity of Moral and Legal Criticism,8 
neither of which saw the light of day, and the successive drafts of 
which seemed like ever more strained efforts to explain something 
to myself that I did not understand. 
 Thus, rather than produce yet another struggling, 
unconvincing effort to solve the conflict between doubt and 
normativity, I will offer two ideas that I think are more valuable. 
This first is a surprising and overlooked lesson from history, and a 
bit of a sociology of the working of doubt over time. It so happens 
that latter-day legal doubters have found themselves stuck in the 
same unresolved struggle that caused an earlier and more 
important cultural movement to dissipate as an independent force, 
the European literary and cultural phenomenon known as 
romanticism.9 Building on this insight, this essay’s organizing 
theme is that if our recent legal iconoclasms have perhaps 
sputtered out for a time, there is a historical example to help 
explain why, and to suggest that they will return. The example of 
the Romantics also nicely corroborates one of the major arguments 
made in this paper: that the logic problem is a problem for all kinds 
of doubters, even if they avoid technical skepticism or outright 
critique of normativity. Most of the Romantics did not seem 
concerned with technical questions of that nature, and yet wound 
up in just the same conflict as epistemological skeptics. 
 Second, I will offer my confession that, apparently, that 
struggle cannot be overcome.  Here will arise what I hope is an 
                                                                                                         
this article accumulated, I revised my aspirations downward to meet my 
performance so many times that I began to feel like a defense contractor.” James 
Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and 
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 496 (1999).  
7 Christopher L. Sagers, Cum Grano Salis (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the author). 
8 Christopher L. Sagers, The Identity of Moral and Legal Criticism (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
9 To be clear, I will not try to prove that any present-day legal philosopher is a 
Romantic. Claims have been made that a huge number of divergent and 
conflicting philosophic or literary movements were “romantic.” But as Arthur 
Lovejoy pointed out long ago, if all these very different things are romantic, 
then the word means nothing at all. See Arthur O. Lovejoy, On the 
Discrimination of Romanticisms, 39 PUBS. MOD. LANG. ASSN. 229, 232 (1924). 
 What is more important is the fact that today’s legal iconoclasm has 
worked itself through the same ultimately exhausting trauma as did the 
Romantics, and I think for the same reason: because at the heart of our 
philosophy are commitments at odds with the normativity ineluctably inherent in 
our purpose as scholars. 
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even more valuable contribution. The paper will carefully model 
the internal logic conflict itself, and then devise a means logically 
to test whether various likely and widely held scholarly purposes 
could, under this test, resolve the conflict.   
 Before going any further, though, the following is 
necessary to avoid confusion:  I do not believe that my own 
inability to solve this logic conflict proves anything about doubt 
itself.  Any such claim would itself be illogical, and would just 
restate the feeble reductio ad absurdum with which skepticism is 
routinely attacked.10  My own doubtful instincts persist unabated.  
If my surrender proves anything, it is only that the logic conflict 
will ultimately have to be reconceived or approached in some way 
other than the one presented here.  
 The problem of the normativity of doubt has been observed 
elsewhere. In law, critics of doubt have frequently made a point of 
it, arguing that it makes doubt itself internally inconsistent,11 that it 
is belied by the way that doubters actually live,12 and that the harm 
                                                
10 A work like this probably had to be written by someone who actually cares 
about this scholarship. External critiques are often written by persons who find 
skepticism so preposterous that they remain fixated on simplistic arguments and 
do not give serious thought to arguments that could actually be troubling to the 
doubter. Accordingly, most criticism in the legal literature comprises no more 
than arguments that all boil down to a reductio ad absurdum, in roughly the 
following form: “Skepticism would leave us in a state of nihilisim [or some 
other seemingly undesirable position], and therefore must be wrong.”  To some 
this point of view has an instinctive appeal, but it turns out to be illogical.  Other 
typical arguments are really just more or less sophisticated restatements of 
claims like “well, it just seems to me like I know things” or “I just know what’s 
right and wrong.” For a collection of these and other such arguments, and more 
extensive thoughts about them, see Sagers, Waiting, supra note 4, at 480-91. 
11 See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 577, 577-83 (1991) (arguing that postmodernism cannot be a useful 
legal philosophy because its basic tenets are contrary to theory-building); 
Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the 
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989) (arguing that the new doubtful 
scholarship has prematurely interred metaphysics); Dennis Patterson, The 
Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal 
Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (arguing that doubt leads to an infinite 
regress of interpretations and ultimately leads to “a philosophical hall of 
mirrors” or a “seriously false and misleading picture of the law.”).  
12 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 84-85 (1986): 
 
[The doubter] cannot reserve his skepticism for some quiet 
philosophical moment, and press his own opinions about the 
morality of slavery, for example, . . . when he is off duty and 
only acting in the ordinary way. He has given up his 
distinction between ordinary and objective opinions; if he 
really believes . . . that no moral judgment is really better than 
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done to normativity is actually dangerous.13 Legal doubters are 
aware of the conflict,14 and some have tried to offer solutions to 
it.15 Commentators are also aware that even in law, it is not new; 
though it goes persistently unresolved, the problem is old.16  
 The paper proceeds in five parts, which successively lay 
out an explanation of the problem itself, the legal work to which I 
think it applies, and then, for context, a practical example of a 
particular legal scholar whose writings are widely cited and appear 
to remain influential, but seem the poorer for failure to address the 
problem.17 The paper’s intellectual heart, however, is in Part IV. 
                                                                                                         
any other, he cannot then add that in his opinion slavery is 
unjust. 
 
See also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 277, 310 (1985) (“[Doubters suffer from] a kind of conceptual 
schizophrenia: when writing they propound subjectivist epistemology, but when 
it comes to daily living they make judgments and decisions as we all do: 
presupposing the existence of tables, chairs, and right answers to hard moral 
dilemmas and legal cases.”). 
13 See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHOD OF THE LAW 316 (1940) (cautioning that the skepticism of the legal 
realists could lead to totalitarianism); Morris Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal 
Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 681, 691 (1936) (criticizing legal realists for 
“nihilistic absolutism”); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1986) (arguing that CLS destroys without providing a replacement 
for what it has destroyed and is thus “politically unappealing and politically 
irresponsible”).  
14 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal 
Studies, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992) [hereinafter Fischl, The Question]; 
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 174 n.18 
(1990) [hereinafter Schlag, Nowhere to Go]. 
15 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and 
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). 
16 That it is an old one in law perhaps reflects the timelessly problematic nature 
of legal administration. Cf. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal 
Ideals, 58 U. CINN. L. REV. 819, 830-31 (1990) (arguing that “iconoclasm” 
unites skeptical legal philosophies, despite their changing methodologies and 
jargon over time, and identifying evidence of it as early as 1345). But indeed, it 
is an old one everywhere, see infra Part IV(9), which is unsurprising in that it is 
not a legal problem as such, and rather is a basic existential dilemma. 
17 The exemplar I chose—Pierre Schlag—will probably make some people roll 
their eyes a little bit. But, while I don’t think I am exactly an Agent of 
P.I.E.R.R.E., see Keith Aoki, P.I.E.R.R.E. and the Agents of R.E.A.S.O.N., 57 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 743, 746 (2003) (a comic strip, no less), there are several reasons 
that this choice makes sense. First, Schlag appears to lack faith as much as a 
person possibly could in knowing. Second, he appears deliberately to have 
remained apolitical. Finally, he has explicitly faced the problems of normativity 
latent in his work and wrestled with them at some length.  
 The analysis here may also be of use in that Schlag’s work is still 
widely cited, but has not been the focus of much sustained analysis. Prior to a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/2
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That Part sets out a list of possible solutions to the inner logic 
problem of broadly skeptical or relativistic critique—in effect, a 
series of possible purposes that the critical author could take as his 
own without invoking a conflict with his own critical 
commitments. Ultimately, none of them are satisfying, as I believe 
that they each fail to meet one or the other of two simple 
requirements. Namely, for methodological reasons that I will 
explain in Part I, the doubter should be able to state a purpose for 
his work that: (1) is not in conflict with his own criticism, and (2) 
does not require that he not care whether his statement of his views 
is “true” or has some other value. It turns out that the list in Part IV 
is the best evidence that our recent iconoclastic legal scholarship is 
really just a latter-day romanticism: as was the case for the 
Romantics themselves, as one continues along this list from one 
solution to the next, it is as if one is climbing a ladder toward ever 
more lyrical, mystical solutions, until one can hardly find any 
resolution except utterly inert quietude. Tellingly, presenting the 
list in increasing order of compliance with the two desiderata 
above—making it easier for the doubter to avoid conflict with his 
purposes and to care about the value of his criticisms—also turns 
out to put them in order of increasingly mystical, magical lyricism. 
 Alas, then, with little else to say, Part V provides some 
brief closing remarks. And a farewell.18 
 
I.  THE PROBLEM: PROPOSITIONS INHERENT IN ACTION OR 
AFFIRMATION 
 
 Capturing what I claim to be the ancient logic problem 
entails one bit of probably contentious analytical philosophy or 
psychology. As mentioned, working through this one technical 
issue, and devising a test from it to evaluate doubtful philosophical 
positions, will be a main contribution of this essay. 
 The problem as I conceive it is that doubters suffer a 
conflict between propositions that seem implied by things that they 
do or say, on the one hand, and the content of their statements, on 
the other hand. Specifically, the act of critique itself—indeed, the 
                                                                                                         
2003 festschrift in the University of Miami Law Review the only sustained 
survey of Schlag’s work appears to have been David Gray Carlson, Duellism in 
Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1937 (1999).  
18 Do not worry. I am not going to pull a Roquentin. Cf. infra note 97-98 and 
accompanying text. I am also not really going to pull much of a Rodell, because 
I do not want to. See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 
(1936); infra Part V. Actually, even Rodell did not completely pull a Rodell. See 
Fred Rodell, Goodby to Law Reviews—Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). 
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mere fact of being, in any state other than inert quietude—seems to 
imply commitment to some proposition that is ineluctably 
normative, or at least affirmative. The reason this instinct is 
probably contentious is that, admittedly, it is not logically 
necessary that an action is itself the statement of a proposition, or 
even evidence of a person’s belief in a proposition. Stating the 
issue in that way begs the question whether people even have 
purposes or know what their purposes are before they act.  
 The problem can be avoided by a more precise statement of 
the goal of this essay. First, I propose that it is an appropriate 
philosophical question whether my own purposes are consistent 
with my own criticisms. It is appropriate at least if a study of the 
resulting inner conflicts could yield generalizable insights. So, 
regardless of whether it could be said that a person must hold a 
given purpose as a logical necessity, I begin by asserting that I, a 
person with doubtful philosophical instincts, do in fact have 
purposes. Second, I believe that this fact can be logically 
generalized. Even if I cannot state that every person who writes or 
speaks has a given purpose, it remains useful to ask whether 
doubtful criticisms are logically at odds with commitments that are 
in fact widely held, or that would be if critics more commonly 
examined their own purposes. Finally, the question of which 
purposes are widely held is an empirical one, and one that I cannot 
answer. So, as an alternative, I will hypothesize a series of what 
seem like likely purposes—the list of purposes that appears in Part 
IV, below—and I will then test them. Importantly, I am not strictly 
interested in whether a given purpose is merely logically consistent 
with doubt. It would be logical for a person to state philosophical 
positions that he actually believes are false, if his purpose is to lie. 
So to generalize the test in a way that is more useful, I propose that 
any purpose that might be a likely one for the doubter should be 
tested against the following two criteria: 
 
(1) the purpose should not conflict with the doubter’s 
own criticisms, and  
(2) it should not require that he not care whether the 
content of his philosophy is “true” or has some 
other value (including by rendering it unimportant 
or innocuous). 
 
 The second criterion needs one clarification. Some 
approaches to solving the doubter’s logical conflict really just 
make the initial doubt itself seem unimportant. They begin by 
claiming that, indeed, we cannot know things, and objective 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/2
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knowledge is highly suspect. But they then say we can proceed 
pretty much as before by using some second-best proxy for 
knowledge. This is a conflict in violation of the second criterion. 
As will be seen below, for this reason the effort just does not really 
work.19 
 In effect the approach in this essay hypothesizes an ideal 
“doubting person,” like the “rational person” of economics or the 
“reasonable person” of tort law, and asks what the ideal doubting 
person could take as a purpose. Admittedly, it skirts the empirical 
psychological issue of how people actually have and experience 
purposes, but it does this for the sake of explanatory power. 
Finally, it bears observing again that while the question being 
asked, strictly speaking, is the fairly narrow one of why state a 
critical proposition, the deeper question is really existential. The 
question asked is really why do anything at all, or even more 
fundamentally, what is the reason for being? 
 An awkward problem is to say to what legal philosophy 
this logic problem applies, because it could apply to different kinds 
of arguments. That is, different kinds of arguments about law state 
or imply propositions that might be illogical because of this 
problem. It would in particular be wrong to impute it to “schools” 
with colloquial labels, like critical legal studies (“CLS”), 
postmodernism, post-structuralism, or pragmatism.20 Most 
obviously, the logic conflict confronts those who explicitly state 
technical skepticism (that is, any epistemological position that 
knowledge is to some greater or lesser extent beyond human 
capacity). However, it also applies to any explicit moral relativism 
or cultural critique that tends to impugn normativity as such. A 
critical legal philosopher may or may not explicitly state a 
                                                
19 See infra Part IV(2).  Brian Tamanaha pointed out what may seem to be a 
logical weakness in the argument of this Part II.  It may not actually be possible 
to engage in inaction, particularly if one takes Sartre’s view that a deliberate 
decision not to choose is itself a choice.  If so, then it is not true that action 
necessarily implies a purpose. For the sake of clarity, I have tried to emphasize 
in the text why I think my test is a worthwhile exercise even though it plainly is 
correct that action does not logically prove purpose.  In the alternative, Professor 
Tamanaha observes that a person could act with no commitments—such a 
person might be the true “ironist.”  But as I suggest in Parts IV(5) and IV(6) 
below, I think that a motive like that would fail or at least pose a serious tension 
under the second element of my test—it would require that the content of the 
doubter’s views do not themselves have any value. 
20 For example, many writers commonly associated with CLS have advocated 
social change or otherwise stated their views without openly skeptical or 
relativistic critique. See, e.g.,William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in 
the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEG. EDUC. 175 (2001) (arguing that law and politics 
are inseparable, but that such a state of affairs is to be desired). 
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skeptical epistemology or a moral relativism. But her approach to 
uncovering injustice hidden within legal concepts will ordinarily 
involve a demonstration of the epistemological or metaphysical 
inadequacies that afflict legal rules. As has been observed, those 
inadequacies turn out not to be limited only to legal concepts, and 
make it hard for CLS scholars to articulate different avenues to 
justice that do not conflict with that same critique.21 For example, 
in the past few decades this kind of critique has often invoked the 
Derridean attack on “privileged perspectives.” To take one well 
known example that is also important to this essay, Pierre Schlag 
once attacked the “stabilized, situated perspective” from which any 
“normative legal thought” proceeds, and argued that once such a 
perspective is no longer “privileg[ed],” then “the specific 
deployments of [its] distinctions” are no longer “experienced as 
valid.”22 The making of that observation implies at a minimum that 
the observation itself has value—that it deserves to be made, that it 
is important. But that judgment, in turn, implies a privileged 
perspective. It implies that the logical error made by normative 
legal scholars—their failure to realize that their prescriptions 
require a logically indefensible privilege for an otherwise unproven 
normative commitment—is bad. It therefore asserts that illogic is 
bad and should be exposed, but does not prove that normative 
commitment except by (illogically) relying on a sense of 
obviousness. One reply might be that observing illogic is just 
aesthetic, and therefore needs no more justification than art.23 But 
aside from the fact that few philosophers seriously consider 
themselves only artists, and fairly constantly state or imply 
propositions seriously at odds with doing just art, art does need 
some justification in my very attenuated sense.24 
                                                
21 See Fishl, The Question, supra note 14, at 781-82 (critiquing MARK KELMAN, 
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)); see also Fiss, supra note 13, at 
9-10; Singer, supra note 15.  
22 Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 
824, 828 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, Normativity]. 
23 Schlag makes this argument. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
24 At the time he wrote the argument quoted above, Schlag replied to just this 
criticism. See Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1991). But his 
reply seems not to deny that there is an internal logic conflict. He said that by 
adopting “the logic of stance—the very same metaphorical logic that prompts 
the question of privilege,” his critics had “short-circuit[][ed]” interesting 
questions about the nature of the subject, and had “frustrate[][d] the . . . project 
of dialogical openness.” Id. at 1061. He implied that there could be 
“jurisprudences that operate differently”—that do not require the taking of 
stances, id. at 1062, but his only indication of what they would be is that they 
would seek “to reveal how the scene of (normatively charged) stances is itself 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss1/2
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 The same logic problem affects broad critiques of law that 
wear formally different clothing. Pragmatists intend to preserve 
their own power to distinguish between better and worse courses of 
action, and generally to rise above nihilism. Even so, since they 
begin their demand for pragmatic, context-specific problem-
solving with an epistemology scathingly skeptical of theory and 
distinctions, they find they have a lot of trouble even stating their 
philosophy without contradicting their own premises.25 A race 
theorist or a cultural anthropologist might insist on a “cultural 
relativism” or “multiculturalism,” so as to allow different peoples 
to be valued without discrimination. The theorist pretty quickly 
seems forced to give equal dignity to seemingly very bad ideas, 
including some directly hostile to the very reasons for theorizing 
about race or culture.  
 Above all, the problem can be implied in places where it is 
not intended and may not be obvious. Legal theory and scholarship 
is almost inevitably normative because of the inescapably 
normative nature of its subject matter. Therefore, a broad criticism 
of law or of theory about law, implying that it is missing some 
necessary predicate or rests on some prior commitment that is 
irremediably deficient, will be very hard to contain so that it does 
not amount to a critique of normativity as such. In any case, there 
is no reason that the logic problem is limited only to critiques of 
law. Generally, even where it is not intended, any broad skepticism 
or critique of intellectual effort usually has immanent within it the 
seeds of strong epistemological critique of normativity. This is so 
even though it may be stated as a critique of language or culture. If 
it broadly impugns the ability of those tools to lead to objectively 
knowable propositions, it implies the same consequences as 
skeptical epistemology and risks the same logical defect. In fact, I 
believe that all of these positions can be converted directly into 
epistemological skepticism, as they are only semantically distinct 
from it.26  
                                                                                                         
constructed,” id. But does not seeking to reveal something imply that it is 
valuable to seek to reveal something?  
25 This problem is explained in detail in Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism and 
Public-Private in the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 
219, 223-24 & n.18 (2006), Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 
YALE L. J. 409 (1990), and Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can 
Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L. 
J. 687 (2003). 
26 Though it is really a point for another day, I believe that such distinctions—
between systematic epistemological and metaphysical critique—are actually 
only semantic. Indeed, I wonder how epistemology is ever more than 
semantically distinct from metaphysics or ontology, since every proposition of 
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 Again, the conflict is more than just a problem of method 
for the scholar, because it is more than just a problem inhering in 
writing or speaking philosophical positions. It is a problem posed 
by the very fact of having a purpose. Accordingly, the truly 
recurrent crisis, which we can expect to see repeated, is a central 
existential one: if action by its nature implies purposes undermined 
by skepticism, but one nonetheless feels compelled by skeptical 
instincts, then one must try to reconcile the having of a purpose 
with the bleak nihilism that seems to follow skeptical critique 
(taken to its logical extreme). In other words, the central question 
in this paper, and the one driving the apparent demise both of the 
Romantics and latter-day legal iconoclasts, is no less than this: 
why exist? 
 Incidentally, a fair criticism is that it seems artificial to 
limit this essay’s concern to legal philosophy. I will say in my 
defense only that, to this extent, I take an important legal literature 
as I have found it. Broadly skeptical critiques of law themselves 
very quickly lead one into purely abstract epistemological or 
cultural criticism. This has led some legal iconoclasts to attempt 
whole new foundational schools of thought or expansive 
psychological models that purport to capture the understanding or 
“doing” of law. Though these efforts normally purport to be meta-
critique relevant only to legal scholarship, there is no obvious 
reason for their limitation to it.27 
 In any case, for the sake of convenience, hereinafter I will 
call this logic conflict “The Problem.”  
 
II.  MODELING LEGAL ROMANTICISM 
 
 So why have I said that this scholarship and its inner 
conflict echo romanticism? 
 I hope I will not be too remiss in not duplicating here some 
long exegesis on the literary and philosophical movement loosely 
known by that name; I think it should suffice to invoke the large 
secondary literature on the topic. Instead, I want to highlight main 
                                                                                                         
metaphysics seems to beg a question of epistemology. At least if one has any 
doubts about knowledge, I wonder if there really is any difference between 
asking “does X exist?” and asking “can I know whether X exists?” Pace Plato, 
incidentally, and 2500 years of footnotes. Cf. PLATO, THEATETUS 9 (Robin A.H. 
Waterfield trans., 1987) (preface; noting, with evident veneration, that 
“Theaetetus establishes the study of knowledge as a branch of philosophy in its 
own right distinct from, especially, ontology.”). 
27 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1047 (2002) [hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics]. 
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themes, and in particular to set out those most illuminating 
parallels to latter-day legal iconoclasm. That the movement’s name 
is difficult to define—indeed, that “movement” is the wrong word, 
and really should be replaced by “constructed artifact of 
convenience among cultural historians”—is well known.28 Also 
commonly said is that “romantic” characterizes a wide collection 
of philosophers, historians, poets and artists, whose work 
collectively contributed to a turn in the development of the modern 
intellectual world of the West. It is sometimes even said that our 
present-day sensibilities really remain “romantic,” to some 
extent.29  
 Though it is probably misleading to some extent to say so, 
romanticism was in many ways in reaction to Enlightenment 
rationality.30 The Romantics were generally fascinated with the 
organic and the natural over the urban and the rational; by 
Gemeinschaft over-rationalized, “artificial” associations; by an 
opposition to analytical conceptual thought;31 by the exaltation of 
                                                
28 As one observer stated, “[t]he idea of [r]omanticism is at once indispensable 
and embarrassing to cultural historians. They cannot do without it[,] . . . [b]ut 
they are acutely worried by the problem of defining it.” Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton, 
Philosophical Romanticism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 778 
(Ted Honderich ed., 1995). There is also Arthur Lovejoy’s famous view: “[t]he 
word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means 
nothing.” Lovejoy, supra note 9, at 232. 
29 ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 1-2 (1965) (“[R]omanticism . . . 
is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the 
Western world. It seems to me to be the greatest single shift in the consciousness 
of the West that has occurred, and all the other shifts which have occurred in the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear to me in comparison less 
important, and at any rate deeply influenced by it.”); BERTRAND RUSSELL, A 
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 682 (1945) (“Revolt of solitary instincts 
against social bonds is the key to the philosophy, the politics, and the 
sentiments, not only of what is commonly called the romantic movement, but of 
its progeny down to the present day.”); see also BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH 
OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (1994) (discussing the rise of individualism and its significance on a 
world scale, circa 1800, a phenomenon associated with romantic rhetoric). 
30 However misleading it may be, though, it is probably in their enemies that the 
Romantics were the most unified. As has been said, “[i]n the case of a 
movement in ideas . . . consensus is most easily discovered in what the 
individuals involved were all against. What they were all for is harder to get at.” 
Franklin L. Baumer, Romanticism (ca. 1780-ca.1830), in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS 198-204 (Philip P. Wiener, ed. 1974). Moreover, as Baumer 
says, “the big story is that the various wings of the romantic movement 
developed largely independently of one another, out of native impulses, but 
also—otherwise there would be no consensus—in reaction against a body of 
ideas common in certain respects to them all.” Id. 
31 As Wordsworth said, “to dissect is to murder.” BERLIN, supra note 29, at 120. 
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the individual and self-actualization, an ideal inevitably at odds 
with universal morality; and by the significance of artistic genius, 
at the expense of le philosophe.32 It does not imply a technical 
“skepticism” of a Pyrrhonian or Academic variety, and indeed 
most philosophical Romantics were confident of their ability to 
derive important metaphysical abstractions through reason 
grounded in a priori premises.33 But basic commitments 
commonly thought to be romantic nonetheless were inherently at 
odds with systematic normativity, and indeed, with system itself. 
Romantics exalted the liberation of the individual, especially the 
idealized “genius” of unbridled artistic creativity, for it is through 
that person that the Infinite is revealed. Within such a strong 
individualism, values were precisely what men created for 
themselves, and therefore there could be room for neither universal 
moral norms nor received aesthetic constraints.34 At its extremes, 
romanticism stood for the view that there is no rational structure in 
reality at all. 
 And there is the rub. However moving those individualistic 
passions may have been—and indeed, however important they 
may have been in the origins of the modern self and modern liberal 
institutions35—they immediately opened the raw need to find some 
alternative means by which to understand, without reverting to all 
that the Romantics had rejected.36 Most tellingly, their solutions 
                                                
32 See generally BERLIN, supra note 27; see also 7 FREDERICK COPLESTONE, 
S.J., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1-21 (Image Books reprint ed. 1994) (1963); 
MORSE PECKHAM, BEYOND THE TRAGIC VISION: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962); RUSSELL, supra note 29, at 675-84; Baumer, 
supra note 30, at 199. Quinton, supra note 28, at 778. 
33 Notably, those significant philosophers most commonly associated with 
romanticism, the post-Kantian German idealists, began by developing their 
central concept of “absolute thought,” “absolute ego” or “infinite spirit,” a 
transcendental, supra-individual, often seemingly god-like metaphysical 
phenomenon by which ultimately to derive a systematic explanation of the 
structure of reality. In one form or another, they captured that reality as the self-
unfolding of absolute reason; it could be understood as reality becoming aware 
of itself through reflection upon itself by one of its own manifestations, human 
awareness. In other words, the universe comes to know itself through the mind 
of man. See COPLESTON, supra note 32, at 3-9. 
34 William Blake’s declaration is emblematic:  
 
“I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another man’s;  
 I will not Reason & Compare: my business is to Create.”  
 
WILLIAM BLAKE, JERUSALEM, ch.1, plate 10 (1804); see also BERLIN, supra 
note 29, at 118-20. 
35 See generally SHAIN, supra note 29. 
36 See BERLIN, supra note 29, at 121-22. 
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tended to become ever more mystical, spiritual and, seemingly, 
desperate. To a reader of the recent generation of legal iconoclasm, 
romanticism’s most familiar trait is this escalation into essentially 
spiritual efforts to resolve the conflict (or to explain how it could 
be left tolerably unresolved), along with its tendency to spin out 
ever more wildly assertive and absolute empirical assertions about 
man’s nature and place in reality.37 
 Again, it is awkward to say that this same cycle played out 
within particular philosophies, and especially to try to attribute it to 
colloquially named schools. I will observe only that in that frenetic 
burst of critical literature beginning in the 1960s and reaching its 
feverish heyday probably between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s, it came ever more clearly to be seen that logically 
necessitated in its nature was a strong skepticism or an iconoclasm 
otherwise leading to moral or epistemological relativism.38 What 
these works share, and what perhaps they inherited from the 
nineteenth century, is a struggle against rationalized knowledge, 
against analytically dissectable science of the social or human. 
Such knowledge was thought to be hostile and stifling to the nature 
of man, who rather is passionate and organic and must be allowed 
to thrive in the irrational. 
 
III.  A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 
 
As a practical example I have chosen the work of Pierre 
Schlag. I believe his work contains The Problem I have 
described.39 The choice is useful because, though he does not say 
                                                
37 See, e.g., id. at 120, arguing that, according to the Romantics: 
 
[w]henever you try to understand anything, by whatever 
powers you have, you will discover . . . that what you are 
pursuing is inexhaustible, that you are trying to catch the 
uncatchable, that you are trying to apply a formula to 
something which evades your formula, because wherever you 
try to nail it down, new abysses open, and these abysses open 
to yet other abysses.”  
 
See also COPLESTONE, supra note 32, at 19-21. 
38 Reaching a culmination of sorts in Symposium: The Critique of Normativity, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991). 
39 I am not the first to notice. See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1937 (“Is it not a 
norm that one should not be normative?”) (alteration in original). Professor 
Carlson’s paper was one of the few thoughtful critiques of Schlag’s work prior 
to a University of Miami symposium in 2003. 
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so himself, most of his work appears to be deliberately apolitical.40 
If even a consciously apolitical argument suffers from the internal 
logic problem I observe, then perhaps it is true that no broadly 
doubtful critique can escape it.41 
 
A. Schlag in Substance: The Metaphysical Critique  
 Schlag does not present his work as a generalizable 
system.42 For present purposes I think that we can focus on one 
particular line of his argument, which happily is quite intriguing, 
and also happens to be the most plainly apolitical: his critique of 
the metaphysics implied by discussions of legal doctrine. For 
convenience I will refer to this as Schlag’s “metaphysical critique.” 
 Schlag has identified the following question as a main 
inquiry: “[w]hen legal thinkers ascribe meaning or consequences to 
authoritative legal sources,” like constitutions, statutes, or judicial 
precedent, “just what are they talking about?”43 He says that in 
answering this question, and in “attempt[ing] to cast [law] in the 
form of science[],” the characterization of law by practitioners, 
judges, and academics has been “aesthetically organized around a 
fundamental ontology of reifications and animisms.”44 
                                                
40 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag’s The Enchantment of Reason, 57 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 513, 513 (2003) (describing Schlag as “vigorously 
refus[][ing] not just political correctness but all concession to our desire that 
enlightenment should be politically edifying.”). 
41 The analysis is not strictly a criticism of Schlag’s work. There might be a 
small logical problem in trying to make it a criticism; as Schlag said at a 2003 
symposium on his works, it is not really fair to fault an argument for failure to 
do everything. He says his critics usually focus not on errors in what he has said 
but on what he fails to say. See Pierre Schlag, A Reply—The Missing Portion, 57 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1029-30 (2003) (taking to task “the sometimes implicit, 
sometimes explicit claim that the failure to include someone’s favorite 
[unattended-to issue] in my account compromises what I have done.”). But my 
view is that no matter what he says or does not say, a legal doubter cannot avoid 
The Problem, and Schlag is only an example. 
42 At least until recently. Cf. Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27 (setting out a 
systematic structure of different “aesthetics” by which to characterize the 
psychological process by which legal actors understand legal phenomena; 
apparently summarizing systematically his previous work on point). Even if it is 
possible to construct a “linear Pierre” from his various non-linear observations, 
see Kennedy, supra note 40 at 515 (purporting to do so), and Carlson, supra 
note 17 , at 1911 (distilling a “four-point thesis” from all of Schlag’s work), 
which is unnecessary here. 
43 Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.YU. L. REV 1681, 1697-98 (1996) 
[hereinafter Schlag, Hiding the Ball] (italics omitted). 
44 Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 877 (1997) 
[hereinafter Schlag, Phrenology]. 
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This in itself is not self-evidently bad. We employ many 
hypothesized non-real entities as a matter of convenience. This 
seems true of tautological mathematical propositions, for example; 
every signifier contained in the proposition “2 + 2 = 4” has only an 
imaginary signified, but the proposition is still practically useful. 
Because we have trouble generally talking about intangible things, 
our language is more full of ontological metaphors than we are 
normally aware. Regardless of whether or not it poses problems in 
other contexts, this way of thinking is problematic when one is 
thinking about law. Though Schlag is not especially explicit about 
it, I take him to mean that in law we expect hypothesized entities—
“authoritative legal sources”—to do things, to be performative. In 
particular, we expect them to constrain or guide application. Thus, 
in law, hypothesized, intangible ontological entities are used as 
part of an “unthinking transformation of classifications designed to 
describe . . . into effective ontological agencies . . . .”45 This can 
also be described as “[a] transposition from epistemic heuristics to 
ontological actualities.”46 This eptistemic-to-ontological 
transformation occurs through three conflations, which Schlag says 
happen concurrently. First, classifications are “transubstantiated 
into robust ontological entities that are part of the world to be 
explained.”47 These hypothesized entities are then “reified: they 
become determinate object-forms with stabilized identities.”48 
Finally, they become ontological agencies, rather than mere 
objects. “[T]hey are endowed with animistic properties. They  
[thus] become capable of producing behaviors, actions, and the 
like.”49 
 It is this epistemic-to-ontological transformation that causes 
the trouble. Because they are not only imaginary, but also have no 
“stabilized referent,” “all manner of complex relations [can] be 
established among” the ontological agencies that are employed in 
law, with the result that “virtually anything could be said about 
how they [are] related to each other.”50 Such agencies thus become 
“super-full objects,” in that they are “composite[s] of a variety of 
attributes, many of which are contradictory or mutually 
repellent.”51 In other words, this transformation causes 
authoritative legal sources—the Constitution, for example—to be 
                                                
45 Id. at 888. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 889. 
50 Id. 
51 Schlag, Hiding the Ball, supra note 43, at 1704-05. 
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“capacious,” such that “they serve as hosts for a great number of 
(often conflicting) cognizable legal meanings.”52 Thus, we in our 
professional culture have the everyday habit of speaking of 
something as natural and simple, when in fact it is complex and 
problematic.  
 
B. Is Pierre Schlag a Normativo?53 
 So is Schlag’s work normatively problematic? In a sense, 
Schlag has in some areas of his work directly attacked normativity 
itself—he has stated a strong, explicit moral skepticism.54 But his 
metaphysical critique is not itself logically a criticism of 
evaluation. It is either or both a criticism of a way of making 
government decisions, and of a way of talking about a behavior. 
Even if his normative critique raises The Problem, his 
metaphysical critique might be severable, to stand on its own and 
be logically tested on its own merits. It is more useful to do that 
here because the question is whether a person can state any broadly 
doubtful position without invoking The Problem. If a doubtful 
argument containing no explicit moral commitments invokes The 
Problem, then maybe they all do. 
 In fairness we should give Schlag a chance to explain his 
own normative commitments, if he has them. I believe that the 
closest he has come to stating his purpose, at least in any careful 
manner, are two very similar statements, one fairly old and one 
quite recent. Twenty years ago he wrote that “[m]y effort here, as 
elsewhere, is to try to displace, decenter, and weaken this system 
of normative legal thought.”55 He did not explain why that was his 
purpose, but in a more recent observation he deepened the insight. 
“Mine is itself an aesthetic project,” he wrote, “an attempt to 
awaken in the reader a sensitivity for and a recognition of the 
different aesthetics of law.”56 Though strictly speaking the latter 
was offered only as an explanation of the paper in question, I take 
it that he would be satisfied with this as a purpose for his writings 
overall. He made fairly clear that it was a basically altruistic, 
humanistic purpose. He said: “[my] project will be successful to 
                                                
52 Id. at 1681. 
53 He once was, apparently, but says he gave it up. See Schlag, Nowhere to Go, 
supra note 14, at 168-69. 
54 This was as explained above at note 22 and accompanying text. Again, he 
seems to have denied that he actually took a position of moral skepticism, but it 
is very hard to see how exactly he avoided it as the necessary consequence of his 
critique of privileged positions. 
55 Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18. 
56 Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1054. 
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the extent it enables the reader to recognize the various aesthetics 
of law and their influence on law and legal professionals—
including most especially herself or himself.”57 
 As a defense to The Problem this argument just begs a 
normative question: you can desire to “awaken . . . 
sensitivit[ies]”58 if you like, but why do that?  
 There is other evidence of Schlag’s normative animus. A 
lot of it is apparently quite superficial; it looks like normativity, but 
perhaps only on the surface. First of all, his prose is laced with the 
language of judgment, as in the tone of his critique of law and legal 
culture,59 his apparent concern with the “violence” of law,60 and 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 This is in part through his depictions of ugliness in law, which seemingly 
conveys that something must be “wrong” or “bad” by the human emotions that 
ugliness invokes. For example, he is bothered by “the fancy corporate law office 
on the thirty-eighth floor, where the ethereal, perfectly typed words of 
impeccably dressed attorneys produce highly mediated, largely unseen effects 
on the messy flesh of humanity below.” Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 
1061; see also Schlag, Normativity, supra note 22, at 805 (“the cherished 
‘ideals’ of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and 
maintenance of precisely those ugly ‘realities’ of legal practice the academy so 
routinely condemns.”). 
 More generally, Schlag often writes about law and legal culture in 
harshly disparaging language. He finds mainstream legal scholarship “pseudo-
science” and “nonsense [rendered] plausible.” Schlag, Phrenology, supra note 
44, at 910, 918. It is often so “utterly unconvincing” and “vacuous” that it must 
be argued with “sufficient self-righteousness, pomposity, pseudo-sophistication, 
or status in institutional affiliation” that “no one will notice.” Schlag, Nowhere 
to Go, supra note 14, at 170. In the end, it is “not simply that normative legal 
thought is coercive and boring, but also ineffectual and (ironically) aimless.” 
Schlag, Normativity, supra note 22, at 851 n.133 (emphasis in original). The law 
is no better. Because there is “no ‘there there,’” legal practice “must be faked, 
bluffed or simulated.” PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 13 
(1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT]. Presumably that is why the 
“empirical, aesthetic, and metaphysical representations of the Supreme Court,” 
at least if they are taken as “valid descriptions of social life,” are “madness.” 
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FESTISHISM AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 8 (1996). 
60 See, e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1050 (“To suggest then that the 
law is an aesthetic enterprise can easily seem cavalier, ethically obtuse, even 
cruel. We are confronted with the disturbing possibility that law paints its 
[violent] order . . . on human beings with no more ethical warrant or rational 
grounding than an artist who applies paint to canvas.”); Pierre Schlag, Anti-
Intellectualism, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1115 (1995) (“The law of judges is 
thus given shape, not by a desire to produce insight or understanding, but rather 
by that law’s desire to hide from itself its own violent and destructive 
character.”).  
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frequent offhand comments that veer close to open normativity.61 
Schlag also occasionally comes close to identifying himself with 
openly political scholarly movements,62 and once in a while he 
comes tantalizingly close to offering a “should” this or a “should” 
that—as when he advises law professors to “stop trying to ‘do 
law,’ or more accurately, stop pretending to ‘do law.’”63 Finally, he 
                                                                                                         
 Schlag also frequently invokes the “field of pain and death.” See Pierre 
Schlag, A Reply—The Missing Portion, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1036 (2003) 
(quoting Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 
(1986) (“Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”) (footnote 
omitted)); see also Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 25, at 1050 (same); Schlag, 
Normativity, supra note 22, at 863 n.168 (same); Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra 
note 14, at 187 (same). 
61 See, e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1077 (“[I]t is obviously 
possible to have intelligent and helpful conversations about the identities of the 
players and the stakes.”); Pierre Schlag, Jurisprudence Noire, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1733, 1740 (2001) (reviewing LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT 
LAWYERS REALLY TALK ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT LAW (1998)) 
(observing that Joseph’s book “could be taught in a cultural studies or law and 
anthropology course,” and “this would surely be a good thing.”); Schlag, 
Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 170 (stating that the “negative point” of 
feminist and CLS scholars “is right and important.”); id. at 190 (“Viewed 
dynamically, normative legal thought could conceivably begin to apprehend the 
crash [of liberal humanism] and respond.”); Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism, 
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1115 (1995) (discouraging the “self-identification of 
the legal thinker” with “the figure of the judge” because it “may not be terribly 
helpful . . . . Indeed, [it] institutes aesthetically, socially, and rhetorically all 
manner of assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs constructed to close off inquiry, 
constructed to shut down thought.”). 
 In an early effort no doubt reflecting the temperament of youth he 
called himself a member of “The Left,” though given the passage of years and 
his failure to do such things ever after perhaps that can be overlooked. See Pierre 
Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost: A 
View From the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919 (1986). 
62 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Politics and Denial, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1136 
(2001) (observing that “[f]or those of us on the margins of CLS, it was always a 
bit frustrating not to know just what CLS thinkers meant by ‘politics.’”).  
 Schlag also once concluded an otherwise bombastic but not obviously 
political article with a few lines that read like Marxist, Walter Benjamin-esque 
critique. See Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 190-91 (arguing that the 
training of lawyers in a “liberal humanist” tradition “is a harmless self-
indulgence, except that it provides instrumentalist bureaucracies with an 
absolutely marvelous and captivating rhetoric that defines, organizes, routinizes 
and services their clientele. It’s all really neat. 7-11 sells freedom (which you 
can find in their Slurpees). Pepsi brings you the downfall of the Berlin Wall.”). 
63 Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 427, 428 (1997) [hereinafter Schlag, Continuation of God]. 
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sometimes goes virtually so far as to say, in effect, “the [article] 
[book] you are reading is an affirmative social good.”64 
 There are several reasons that for present purposes I will 
take all these possible lapses cum grano salis. First, as for Schlag’s 
sometimes disparaging tone and loose, superficially normative 
prose, I believe that he normally does these things coyly and as a 
deliberate matter of style. One could also ignore some of these as 
moments of incaution in less-serious, presumably less-worked 
pieces, and one might observe that Schlag sometimes carefully 
couches or equivocates these kinds of statements so as not to cause 
internal conflict.65 
 Other seemingly problematic normative evidence is really 
much harder to ignore. First of all, everything in Schlag’s writing 
betrays an aching desire to explain why this all just feels wrong—
to know why law has “failed to live up to its ambitions”66 —and to 
find a different understanding of law that does not. He more or less 
explicitly argues as much in his comparison of legal scholarship to 
the nineteenth century “pseudo-science” of phrenology. The 
purpose of the comparison, he says, is that “something might be 
learned by trying to understand how the phrenologists went 
wrong.”67 His conclusion is that both disciplines share a common 
doom by way of his own metaphysical critique. The phrenologists 
“had their ontology wrong. The fundamental faculties [which were 
hypothesized personality traits thought by the phrenologists to bear 
a measurable and predictable quantitative correlation to the size of 
                                                
64 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 423 
(1992) (observing that, if we examine mainstream scholarship in the proper 
critical manner, “we might [arrive at] an understanding of what ‘law’ is and how 
‘law’ maintains itself.”). 
65 For example, while he advised law professors to “stop pretending to ‘do 
law,’” he gave this advice only to “those legal academics who find th[e] 
prospect” of being forced “to participate in [a] covertly theological discourse” to 
be “unappealing.” Schlag, Continuation of God, supra note 63, at 428. 
 Incidentally, there are also certain tics in Schlag’s writing that seem 
potentially to create internal logic problems, which are not really relevant here. 
For instance, he sometimes writes about imaginary or inanimate things as 
subjective agencies. “[R]eason,” for one, “secrete[s] its own objects and frames 
in language and practice,” Schlag, Continuation of God, supra note 63, at 439, 
and it has an “ambition . . . to rule,” SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 59, at 
81. This to me seems merely playful and unobjectionable. More problematic is 
his habit of asserting the absolute nature of problems, which absoluteness he 
appears to know only on the basis of a priori speculation. These pronouncements 
often take on what seems like an openly theological eschatology, and to that 
extent resemble a problem noticed in connection with romanticism, discussed 
above. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
66 Schlag, Phrenology, supra note 44, at 886. 
67 Id. at 878. 
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‘cranial prominences’] did not exist. They were not linked to the 
size of cranial organs. Further, the cranial organs did not bear any 
relation to cranial prominences.”68 Likewise, the failure of law 
results from its “amalgamation of animisms and reifications; of 
self-referential complexity, of self-legitimations and folk 
beliefs.”69 
 Another evident purpose that Schlag more or less 
acknowledges is to expose intellectual dishonesty, of which he 
seems eager simply to make people aware. As mentioned above, he 
says that his “project will be successful to the extent it enables the 
reader to recognize the various aesthetics of law and their influence 
. . . .”70 
 Schlag has not been unaware of the logical conflicts these 
purposes seem to raise, given his own critique of legal 
epistemology, metaphysics, and normativity. The only answer he 
has been able to offer is of a fairly common type, and for reasons 
elaborated below,71 it is not especially convincing. He has 
acknowledged that work like his “often treads very close to issuing 
some normative judgments of its own,” but argued that “while the 
normative vocabulary and grammar [of mainstream legal 
discourse] are no longer an acceptable currency for intellectuals to 
use in advancing claims for human beings, there is no other 
vocabulary, no other grammar, as of yet.”72 Likewise, he felt it 
okay to “recognize[] and embrace[] [the] predicaments and 
paradoxes” within his own critique, because the “insist[ence] on 
naive rationalist conceptions of coherence, consistency, elegance, 
etc., is largely the product of disciplinary hubris and the inertia of 
academic bureaucracy.”73 Indeed, he continues, to attempt to avoid 
the paradox would be wasteful, for “[i]t would beg the exceedingly 
interesting question of where the boundaries (if any) of this system 
                                                
68 Id. at 886. 
69 Id. at 887. 
70
 Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1054. One other obvious problem 
explained by Schlag’s metaphysical critique is that the capaciousness of super-
full objects permits the familiar indeterminacy criticized by CLS, see, e.g., 
KELMAN, supra note 21, at chs. 1-3, which is arguably “bad” for political 
reasons. However, Schlag does not seem personally concerned with 
indeterminacy and, in the rare instances when he even mentions it, he seems to 
offer it mainly as evidence of other, essentially aesthetic problems. See, e.g., 
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 59, at 20-21 (mentioning the CLS 
indeterminacy argument apparently as evidence of why mainstream legal 
thinkers react defensively to the metaphysical critique). 
71 See infra Part IV(7). 
72 Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18. 
73 Id. 
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of normative legal thought are located and whether this system can 
even be adequately conceptualized as having a determinate or 
localizable inside and outside. These are complex and interesting 
questions, and I am not about to close them off prematurely simply 
because the rationalist aesthetic of traditional legal thought abhors 
paradox.”74 
 In two ways, the fact that Schlag reached this point shows 
how closely latter-day legal iconoclasm mirrors the experience of 
the Romantics. First, he started with enthusiastic, bombastic, 
jubilant critique, and found sympathy throughout the academy (he 
remains among the most frequently cited American legal 
academics). But second, when pressed, he came up against The 
Problem, even though he more than others has avoided political 
commitments. Even more telling is that his explicit attempt to 
solve it borders on the magical—though there is “no . . . 
vocabulary, no . . . grammar, as of yet” in which to explain a 
solution, we must “embrace[] . . . predicaments and paradoxes,” a 
defiance that ultimately preserves for us “exceedingly interesting 
questions . . . .”  
 
IV.   WHAT COULD THE ANSWER BE? OTHER IDEAS THAT DON’T 
WORK 
 
 Over many, many years, several answers have been offered 
to The Problem, and I have come up with some others of my own. 
One theme unifies them, which is that they each seem 
unsatisfactory for one of two reasons: that is, they fail the test that 
was laid out in Part II, above. First, the answer should not conflict 
with doubt itself, and it would conflict if it evaded The Problem by 
pretending that the initial doubts themselves are just unimportant. 
Thus it should not supply an alternative definition of knowledge or 
normativity that in itself renders doubt innocuous. It is no help to 
the doubter if the answer is to compromise all doubtful insights; he 
should not render skepticism impotent simply in order for it to be 
logically coherent. Otherwise, he should give up doubt. Second, 
the doubter can’t be satisfied by answers whose strategy is to 
dissociate the purpose of writing from its substance. Thus, a 
satisfactory answer would require the writer to care about the 
writing, at least in some way. 
 Therefore, an answer to The Problem is not going to be 
compelling unless it does the following: it allows the doubter to 
care about the substance of his writing without compromising the 
                                                
74 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 Jurisprudence Review [March 24 
view that his doubtful insights ever mattered in the first place. 75 It 
is here, again, that a key evidence of the affinity with romanticism 
becomes clear. In searching for a purpose that seems permissible 
under this standard, we will, as did the Romantics, climb a ladder 
into ever greater abstraction, eventually reaching outright 
mysticism. 
 I can think of a series of possible answers, but none of them 
seem to work. Below is a list of hypothesized purposes that seem 
likely, in summary form. They appear in an important order: they 
are both in order of increasing compliance with the two conditions 
above, and increasing mystical abstraction. They are: 
(a) The Truth for Its Own Sake;  
(b)  Altruism and/or the Second-Best “Market Place of 
Ideas” (also known as “Pragmatism”); 
(c) Pure Aesthetics; 
(d)  Self-Service and Fame;  
(e)  Malevolent Self-Service;  
(f)  Self-Service and Fun;  
(g) Infinite Preservation of Absurdity and the Poetry of 
the Impossible (also known as the “Always 
Already” Trick); 
(h)  Justification of Existence; 
(i)  Quasi Buddhism;  
(j) Art; and 
(k) Complete Revision of Our Job Description. 
 
A. The Truth for Its Own Sake  
Most obviously, people might write philosophy because 
they want to know the truth. (The reason they seek truth might be a 
second purpose, an altruistic one, perhaps; I will consider that 
next.) This seems like a pretty bad idea for a doubter. Although the 
goal of truth is certainly one that real people pursue in the real 
world, and though that class undoubtedly includes some people 
sharing the doubter’s outlook, I think it is too radically in conflict 
with the doubter’s resignation to accept as a purpose. Even recast 
as mere positive description—law as aspirationally non-normative 
social science—work that also endorses any serious doubt will 
                                                
75 To be clear, I will not consider what any particular writer might actually 
desire or intend, since a writer might have a desire or intent that is logically at 
odds with his or her own premises.  The question is, rather, what should a 
hypothesized doubting person, with the two pre-commitments contained in the 
test, take as a purpose? See supra Part II. 
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conflict with well known and prominent normativity problems 
inherent in social theory.76 
 
B. Altruism and/or The Second-Best “Market Place of 
Ideas” (also known as “Pragmatism”)  
The fact, however, that some (most?) writers believe that 
they are seeking the truth suggests another purpose: whether or not 
they have any hope of finding the truth, they are seeking it for 
someone. For themselves, yes, but since they document their 
search in publicly accessible documents, some of them presumably 
are seeking truth for others as well—for example, mankind. Thus, 
most writers undoubtedly hope that their writings will yield some 
benefit for other people, whether it be better policy, a better 
understanding of life, or purely a more accurate understanding of 
whatever is the question at hand. The double problem is that even 
if the goal (justice? superior policy?) were not already quixotic 
given the doubter’s doubts, The Problem is still implicated. That is, 
you may seek a “benefit,” but why is it a “good” in the first place? 
The doubter’s views do not obviously rule out a desire to amuse 
other people or make them happy or whatever.77 The problem 
arises when the doubter tries to serve that good-natured desire 
through some means that the doubter’s own premises hold to be 
impossible. 
 One quotidian rebuttal is that The Problem itself can simply 
be recast in some way so that it does not actually frustrate 
normative policy discussion—that is, so that one can both be a 
critic of legal doctrine as such and yet still write scholarship with 
normative implications. To many people this seems simple, 
because it only requires some second-best alternative definition of 
“knowledge” that depends on some measure of reliability or 
usefulness, rather than certainty, and therefore resembles how we 
in fact live our everyday lives. This is also why many people think 
doubters are ridiculous. It is implied that the problem is with 
skepticism itself, in that it asks too much from reality. “You 
skeptics,” the argument goes, “allow the perfect to be the enemy of 
the good.” Another way of saying this, with my apologies to those 
who believe I am glossing over important details, is “why can’t we 
just be pragmatists?” 
                                                
76 Cf. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics 
Movement: Confronting the Problems of Non-Falsifiability and Normative Bias, 
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991) (noting a series of such problems inherent 
even in would-be non-normative economic theory). 
77 But see infra Part IV(3). 
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 I think that this is in fact the way that most of legal 
academia now explains itself. Most law professors share some 
sense of the metaphysical flabbiness of legal discourse and there is 
apparently a common consensus about indeterminacy and the 
politicization of law. And yet few law professors would concede 
that this means their normative, more or less doctrinal scholarship 
is not an affirmative social good. Likewise, I expect that this self-
image actually animated most of legal realism and CLS.78 At least 
once a person associated with CLS argued that critique does lead 
to utter nihilism, but that nihilism nevertheless does not prohibit 
“passionate moral commitments.”79 
 My response is that in some sense this rebuttal is right—all 
roads really do lead to pragmatism. It is just that pragmatism is 
really, really bad, if you want either (1) to preserve a notion of the 
“good” with any stability or claim to preservation, or (2) to believe 
skepticism is not trivial or irrelevant. 
 Another strategy within this rubric is to treat 
epistemological critique as a matter of academic hygiene—
skepticism does no more than remind you to be vigilant about your 
own assumptions and take care to avoid undue pretensions to 
truth.80 First, I do not think that this is actually as feasible as it 
might seem, as I tried to show in connection with the discussion of 
Schlag.81 It is actually extremely hard to write without stating or 
implying normative propositions logically at odds with skepticism. 
                                                
78 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 20, at 178, 181-84 (seemingly critical of the 
academic “tendency to move above the terrain of political contest,” claiming 
that “nearly everyone believes that politics can and should be principled in 
important respects”; calling generally for a larger “nonconservative” or “left of 
center” social program to rival the conservative one currently in action which 
allegedly has made law-and-economics successful in worldly respects); Mark G. 
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-304 (1984) (alteration in 
original). 
79 Singer, supra note 15, at 7. As I understand him, Singer argues that 
normativity can be reconstructed in the wake of nihilistic critique by a process 
of “moral decisions” that are no different than our “everyday moral decisions.” 
Id. at 62, Singer sets out a short list of rudimentary values he believes should be 
discovered through this process, including the prevention of cruelty and misery. 
See id. at 67-70. 
80 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Epidemiology of Critique, 57 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 475, 485-86 (2003) [hereinafter Fischl, Epidemiology] (“[T]o ‘read 
Schlag’ is to become far more self-conscious about one’s participation in the 
conventions of legal scholarship,” but that merely makes it “impossible to cast 
[law] in a role that has it doing all the work . . . without a wink or some other 
form of rhetorical distancing.”). 
81 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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And second, even if it were feasible, it would mean that doubt does 
not matter.  
 
C. Pure Aesthetics  
Maybe the skeptic can simply say that his purpose is to 
expose ugliness or intellectual dishonesty in legal discourse. Such 
a purpose seems hard to criticize, and might seem comfortably and 
appropriately non-normative. The problem is that there is in fact a 
norm. The fact of making the criticism itself implies the value that 
it is better to cleanse ugliness and purge dishonesty, and indeed an 
honest aesthete would normally have to admit an altruistic motive 
as well—the beautification is being done for mankind. Therefore, 
if the ugliness or dishonesty to be exposed is the very illogic of 
normativity itself or the systematic epistemological or 
metaphysical failures in law as such, then The Problem is in full 
effect.82 
 
D. Self-Service and Fame  
Though I’m sure it would be slightly tref to say it out loud, 
some component of most people’s desire to write is the desire to 
be, alas, famous. This desire in fact could explain a lot of scholarly 
effort. Do graduate students in music composition really listen to 
Stockhausen, Boulez, or Elliot Carter (gritting their teeth) because 
they like it? Do graduate students in women’s studies read 
Foucault because they want to know the truth? Maybe sometimes, 
but often not.83 I think most people who do these things do them in 
part because they want to become famous.84 
                                                
82 One might try to distinguish this argument by saying “yes, but my argument is 
not about beauty, it is about understanding the way we think about law.” See, 
e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1051. The problem is that even if a 
person intends only that, one must still ask why the person does it, at least if 
either the aesthete or the one questioning him also believes in a radically 
doubtful critique of law itself. Anyway, I think that the purported aesthete rarely 
intends any more than that. 
83 I think this explains why young doubters, who might secretly believe in an all-
encompassing and earth-scorching nihilism, can pump out scholarship that is 
normative in one way or another, so long as the goal of getting really, really 
famous can plausibly be kept afloat. In this way fame does the same existential 
work for young legal academics that clients do for practicing lawyers. Contrary 
to what script-writers for television lawyer shows evidently imagine, practicing 
lawyers seem largely unconcerned as to whether their clients’ positions are 
“right” or “just” in any transcendental sense. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A lawyer must also act . . . with zeal in 
advocacy upon the client's behalf.”). 
84 This is occasionally admitted, though not often by the people seeking the 
fame. The late Fred Rodell of Yale said as much of the “studious gents who 
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 This self-serving motivation is not in itself logically self-
contradictory. I do not think the criticism that is the doubter’s 
defining trait requires the doubter not to seek fame, even as the 
sole purpose of writing. This is so because the mere criterion of 
internal coherence does not require any normative outcome, 
including “correctness.” In itself, it does not require the writer to 
prove or accomplish anything related to the content of his work. It 
merely requires that the doubtful writer’s motives not be in conflict 
with other observations the doubter makes—about our epistemic 
capacity, the resulting consequences for knowledge and 
objectivity, and so on. For what it is worth, I see no reason to 
believe that, say, narcissism or ambition are so bad in themselves.  
  Obviously the self-serving motivation purpose fails the 
other criterion of the test in Part II, because it would require the 
doubter’s purpose to be divorced from his content. Interestingly, if 
we stopped here one might say that what I have really done is just 
to prove as a matter of logical necessity that the doubter’s only 
coherent purpose must be some cynical self-service. This is not 
good. 
 
E. Malevolent Self-Service  
There are other reasons to write that also seem self-serving, 
or perhaps other ways to describe this same desire to be famous, 
that are also logically permissible from the doubter’s perspective. 
Maybe the doubter wants to work out frustration because he 
resents the world and wants to retaliate in some way. Maybe he is 
both weak and angry and can find no other way to soothe his 
impotent rage than to strive for the envy of his peers. Maybe he is 
like Jean-Batiste Clamence from Camus’s The Fall, who tried to 
convince the world of its own guilt so that he could be their 
superior.85 Again, however bad, selfish, or unhealthy these motives 
might seem, I think they pose no logical conflict with doubt itself. 
                                                                                                         
diddle around in the law reviews,” noting that “the accepted way of getting 
ahead in law teaching is to break constantly into print in a dignified way.” See 
Rodell, Goodbye to Law Review, supra note 18, at 43, 44. A dyspeptic effort to 
be as funny as Rodell is Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the 
Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 927 (1990) (“To some degree 
all of them—whether genuine scholars, would-be wisemen, or coerced clones—
are motivated by the gratification of ego, the satisfaction of habit, and the 
expectations of university image-makers.”). Also interesting is Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1996). I think the 
surprising thing is not that anyone has said these things, but that so few have. 
85 See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (Vintage Reissue ed. 1997). I think, 
incidentally, that there is another, quite different reading one could make of The 
Fall, and it is one that should be of interest to lawyers. I’m keeping it to myself 
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 Again, not only do self-serving motivations like these 
violate one of my criteria, they turn out not to be even very good 
descriptions of possible motives for philosophizing. Though 
narcissism, ambition, or cruel self-service can perhaps explain 
writing produced for other people’s consumption, writing does not 
account for all of what doubters do. There is no necessary 
difference between confronting your intuitions silently or out loud. 
Silent activity is at least sometimes not related to the desire to be 
famous. The doubter’s inner longing is like secret prayer to the 
faithful, which seems divorced from its impact on others. So there 
is something else going on when the doubter writes, it seems to 
me, in addition to any illegitimate motive like a search for truth, 
and illogical yet self-serving motives like the desire for fame or 
cruelty. In any event, this motive cannot be the one that, for me, 
solves The Problem. 
 It turns out that there is one other self-serving answer that 
seems to overcome even these problems. Namely: 
 
F. Self-Service and Fun  
This one is harder. There is nothing obviously illogical 
about a doubter writing because it is enjoyable.86 Indeed, writing 
because you want to write is not undermined even by the argument 
that it implies that writing itself is good, and therefore illogically 
makes a positive claim about a value, because, strictly speaking, 
writing because you want to has the same rhetorical content as 
eating because you want to eat. That is, it has no rhetorical content. 
It implies no proposition except that the writer wants something, 
and therefore there is nothing to be logically incoherent with 
anything else. 
 It is harder for me to say that this is not the answer (and as I 
will explain later, this motive is part of why this paper is a 
farewell). The reason it is not ultimately satisfying is that if one is 
writing doubt and still having fun with it, one must almost 
certainly not care about the inner coherence of the writing.87 
                                                                                                         
for now, though, as I don’t believe anyone else seems to have thought of it and it 
will be the subject of a future paper. 
86 Cf. Carlson, supra note 17, at 1911 (taking Pierre Schlag to task because “we 
need not . . . feel bad because we enjoy reading and writing legal scholarship.”). 
87 I mean, a tautology is not what a doubter is hoping for at all—all I have said 
here is “the doubter writes because he wants to.” This pure self-service motive 
“legitimates” a doubter’s writing when the doubter is not even trying to be right 
or to make something he thinks is good. Indeed, it would be the very desire to be 
“right” or to make something “good” that would be the problem. The problem 
for me, obviously enough, is that my motive is more complex than simple self-
interest, and if I were really convinced that the only intellectually acceptable 
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G. Infinite Preservation of Absurdity and the Poetry of the 
Impossible (also known as the “Always Already” Trick)  
A sophisticated solution that doubters themselves have 
devised is that the apparent paradox of The Problem is okay—that 
there is nothing wrong with paradox and that indeed it should be 
preserved. Thus, for all I know, maybe this paper itself is wrong by 
its nature—maybe looking for the answer is itself the problem. 
Camus derided all the “leaps” by which other doubters had avoided 
the nihilism implicit in their doubts;88 he thought that any attempt 
to resolve the apparently absurd nature of human existence is “[t]o 
impoverish that reality whose inhumanity constitutes man’s 
majesty,” and believed therefore that “[i]t is essential to die 
unreconciled [because] . . . in that consciousness and in that day-
to-day revolt [absurd man] gives proof of his only truth, which is 
defiance.”89 Some CLS adherents similarly counsel against the 
search for inoculation from The Problem; they say that not only is 
it not a virus, it is a good thing.90 
 A slightly different incarnation of the argument in effect 
blames the nature of language itself for logical contradictions 
inherent in critique of law. That is, it is not the critic’s fault that the 
only language he can use to criticize law and culture is the very 
language of that culture itself. In some people’s work this comes 
off as pretty shallow and sophistical; as Schlag observed, “[o]ne of 
the tricks of some postmodernist writers is to avoid explicitly 
making normative statements, knowing full well that the reader 
will read the language in a normative way and that, in a pinch, the 
reader can always be blamed for having read those ‘normative’ 
judgments into the text.”91 
 Sometimes this is better handled. I think Schlag has done it 
better than others; his version of the argument was already set out 
                                                                                                         
reason for which I could write were cynical or evil, I would stop writing. 
Anyway, so far as it matters to me, I think we can safely assume that no one 
writes, says, or thinks philosophy solely for cynical or self-serving motives like 
fame or envy, without caring about rightness or beauty or other content-related, 
value-driven matters. I will not be satisfied until I explain some motive of the 
doubter that captures the richness of his feelings when he writes but that is also 
legitimate. 
88 ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 1, 32-50 (Justin O’Brien trans., Vintage Books 1991) (1942). 
89 Id. at 55. 
90 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 73 
(1997); Fischl, Epidemiology, supra note 80, at 479. 
91 Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18. 
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above.92 Professor Fischl thoughtfully observed that “[w]e can’t 
step outside of ‘law’ and look at it,” because when we do so “we 
are looking at us.”93  
 A final variation is that the contradiction implied by The 
Problem is good because it is a necessary engine of the dialectical 
evolution of culture. The argument as I have heard it begins with a 
tremendous problem of public relations, in that it relies on 
Hegelian metaphysics and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In any case, 
the idea is that internal contradiction in law and other normativity 
merely evinces dialectical change underway, such that, though they 
may never be perfect, law and normativity are always in the 
process of “becoming.” To hold their inchoate nature against them 
would be to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good.94 
Incidentally, it appears that Schlag’s later work could be 
understood as essentially aspiring to a dialectic vision of this 
nature, valuing the impossibility of essentials as the motor of 
human creativity.95 
 My problem with all these views is that however thoughtful 
they are, they actually seem to do no more than restate the same 
old normativity in fancy language. If preservation of paradox is 
good, it must be good for something, and often as not the 
something turns out to be the same social values for which 
everyone from the center and on to the left has always argued. 
Even the Hegelian model seems like just old-fashioned dialectical 
materialism, since the “something” it is good for is the 
                                                
92 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
93 Fischl, The Question, supra note 14, at 802. 
94 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1934-35; see also J. M. Balkin, Transcendental 
Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1139, 1176-83 
(1994); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive 
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 986-88, 1028-
30 (1990); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 166, 197-201 (1996). See generally Sagers, supra note 4, at 476-
77. 
95 Namely, he appears to have summarized his entire previous critique of the 
metaphorical conceptualization of law in Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27. But 
in this work he has implied, arguably in some tension with prior work, that even 
when legal culture is seen in the most critical, anti-foundationalist and 
decentered mood, in which we experience “identities collapsing and . . . 
differentiation falling away,” there is something left to be desired. Id. at 1115. 
Apparently he endorses our willing embrace of this experience (though he is 
fairly non-prescriptive in saying so), so that we can “appreciate law as a creative 
enterprise . . . .” Id. at 1115. He says: “to reject this [critical and decentered] 
aesthetic as destructive, on the ground, for instance, that it renders law 
impossible, is to shut oneself off from an important experience of law and its 
creative aspects.” Id. at 1094. 
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destabilization of illegitimate hierarchies and so on. Professor 
Carlson’s Lacanian model is harder to fault in itself; but as he 
states it, it reads like mere positive description of the human 
psychological predicament and therefore fails my other goal, 
which is to make doubt matter. 
 
 
 
H. Justification of Existence  
Sartre adds an interesting perspective. The protagonist of 
Nausea, his first novel,96 is Antoine Roquentin, a middle-aged 
would-be historian, who at the time of the story has become 
disillusioned with life and the quest for meaning, and suffers 
pathological loneliness. Roquentin may be no breath of sunshine, 
but he provides another and the subtlest yet of the reasons one 
might write: as Roquentin says, writing is perhaps no more than a 
means to “justify your existence.”97 He decides at the very end that 
he can “justify [his] existence,” he “might succeed . . . in accepting 
[himself],” by writing a novel.98 
                                                
96 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA (Lloyd Alexander trans., 1964) (1938). 
97 Id. at 237. Roquentin’s crucial revelation is to realize, as a result of his face-
to-face struggle with nothingness, that there are no “adventures.” As a young 
man, Roquentin traveled the world and had affairs with women—all in the 
search, he later realizes, of adventure. Roquentin recalls his frustration one day, 
during the course of a love affair, over the fact of his lover’s existence. Her 
reality—as opposed to the idea of her—spoiled the “adventure” of the affair. 
Thus, when she was away from him, his affair with her was a fantasy—he was 
finally living what he imagined real life should be. But then she reappeared and 
he found himself hating her—because in her real presence “one had to begin 
living again and the adventure was fading out.” Id. at 56. As he says, 
“everything they tell about in books can happen in real life, but not in the same 
way.” Id. at 54. It was this, then, that by middle age had eroded what Roquentin 
had lived for. The promise of meaning latent in culture—which always seemed 
just beyond his reach and which kept his life in motion—had turned out to be a 
fantasy. 
98 Id. at 237-38. He says, imagining how his own existence would be molded by 
the fact of having written a book, that 
 
there would be people who would read this book and say: 
“Antoine Roquentin wrote it, a red-headed man who hung 
around cafes,” and they would think about my life . . . as 
something precious and almost legendary. [The book at first] 
wouldn’t stop me from existing or feeling that I exist. But a 
time would come when the book would be written, when it 
would be behind me, and I think that a little of its clarity might 
fall over my past. Then, perhaps, because of it, I could 
remember my life without repugnance. 
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 This does not really work for me. First of all, I think Sartre 
is just being unduly French in claiming one’s existence needs 
justification. I for one am pretty content despite complete 
agreement with Sartre’s conception of the human existential 
predicament, and for now at least am troubled only by an evident 
logical problem in a scholarly endeavor with which otherwise I am 
in love. 
 Another problem with listening to Roquentin is that Sartre 
did not intend the story as advice to the troubled doubter. Indeed, 
he viewed Roquentin’s new optimism with cruel, subtle irony. 
Though it is not at all obvious, and though Sartre gives no other 
hint that this is what he intended, Nausea is written as a collection 
of journal entries, “found,” says the book’s fictional Editor’s Note, 
“among the papers of Antoine Roquentin,”99 suggesting that at 
some time after his optimistic renaissance Roquentin killed 
himself. Indeed, in nearly his last words in Nausea, Roquentin says 
that after his novel is finished he hopes that he will look back on 
the moment when he decided to write it and say “[t]hat was . . . 
when it all started.”100 This is the same way that in his youth he 
described the “adventures” of which he dreamed, his many, 
invariably hopeless attempts to live the real life he imagined.101 In 
his optimism at the end of the book, Roquentin apparently had 
forgotten the critical discovery of nothingness that he recorded 
much earlier in his journal.102 This in itself reflects what I tend to 
think is the case: writing to justify one’s own existence does not 
answer The Problem, because it really just begs the same old 
normative questions that have been held in abeyance. 
 
I. Quasi Buddhism  
An idea that I find more compelling can be found in the 
writings of the ancient skeptics. Ancient skepticism is curiously 
neglected in modern academia, given the enormous significance it 
                                                                                                         
 Id. at 238. 
99 Id. at 6. 
100 Id. at 238. 
101 See id. at 54 (“Now I see so clearly what I wanted. Real beginnings are like a 
fanfare of trumpets.”).  
102 Strictly speaking, I suppose it does not really matter if Sartre meant that 
Roquentin was a fool. The question is not the psychological one of how we 
should evade despair, but whether it is logically coherent for the doubter to write 
to save his own life. One might observe, incidentally, that Sartre himself wrote 
not only one, but several novels and other works, almost all of them following 
Nausea, and all while living what seems to have been a happy life. 
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had in the ancient Mediterranean and in the Rennaissance.103 
Though it is now seriously studied only by specialist philosophers 
and classics scholars, I think most of what is said by 
phenomenologists, the existentialists, and other modern doubters 
already exists in ancient skepticism. To be precise, I mean the 
skepticism attributed to an influential Greek figure of the fourth 
century B.C.E. named Pyrrho of Elis, the only significant extant 
record of which is found in the writings of a second century C.E. 
philosopher named Sextus Empiricus.104 The skepticism recorded 
by Sextus is all encompassing and earth scorching—he argued that 
because we seem always incapable of choosing from among any of 
the possible judgments we might make, we are left in a state 
Sextus calls epoche—that is, suspension of judgment.105 
 Sextus tells us that the reason the skeptic chooses epoche—
or perhaps more accurately, resigns himself to it or allows it to 
overtake him—is to seek tranquility. In his view and allegedly in 
that of Pyrrho, the problem in life is our drive to answer questions 
affirmatively, a drive that will always be frustrated. Reasoning that 
the absence of frustration leaves one in tranquility, the skeptic of 
Pyrrho’s flavor suspends judgment.106 Sextus also seems to have a 
pretty good answer for the evident conflict between the doubter’s 
radically skeptical epistemology and the means by which he must 
express it. He says that in “attending to what is apparent, we live in 
accordance with everyday observances, without holding 
opinions—for we are not able to be utterly inactive.”107 Therefore, 
so long as the skeptic avoids holding opinions, he can have a job, 
eat, enjoy things, and observe social customs.108 The observation is 
                                                
103 See generally RICHARD POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SKEPTICISM: FROM 
SAVANAROLA TO BAYLE (2003). 
104 See SEXTUS, supra note 4. That claim is perhaps subject to some dispute 
since well known figures in later phases of Plato’s academy, notably Carneades 
and Clitomachus, also purported that their teachings followed Pyrrho. Sextus 
tells us otherwise, see id. at 57-62, and he is nowadays usually taken at his word 
in that respect. See BARNES, supra note 4. 
105 See id. at 47. Barnes and Annas translate έποχή as “suspension of judgment,” 
though it is often merely transliterated to epoche. Cf. BARNES, supra note 4, at 
8-9. 
106 See id. at 10-11. 
107 SEXTUS, supra note 4, at 9. 
108 See id. at 9 (“By nature’s guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and 
thinking. By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst 
to drink. By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an 
everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By teaching of kinds 
of expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept. And we say all this 
without holding any opinions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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simply that the mere living of life in an ordinary manner does not, 
in itself, imply propositions at odds with skepticism. 
 The problem is that Sextus never explains why one would 
not just go the whole way and be a real Buddhist.109 That is, 
“tranquility” seems like a plausible defense of doubt in and of 
itself, but not of doubtful writing. Indeed, “tranquility” seems not 
the likely state of a man who argues a lot, and no one could argue 
more than Sextus did.110 In any case, this essentially Buddhistic 
motivation resembles “self-service” and “fun” insofar as it seeks 
the internal reward of “tranquility,” but it just seems to be incorrect 
as an explanation for why one would express doubt publicly.111 
 
J. Art  
In some sense, maybe the most compelling argument is that 
The Problem is actually wrong, because even the doubting law 
professor is fully licensed to “do art.” The issue might be that The 
Problem itself quietly draws a distinction between “philosophy” 
and “art.” That is, it presumes that “philosophy” exists as a thing 
importantly distinct from other things, including art. We normally 
do not insist that art defend its own “purpose,” and many of us 
hold it to no standard of “truth” or “objective goodness.” 
Therefore, if the art/philosophy distinction is not real, maybe there 
is nothing wrong with writing about philosophical matters for the 
sake of writing about them, even though they may not attain 
logical provability.112 
                                                
109 The fascinating thing is that there is evidence that Sextus, and Pyrrho before 
him, really were Buddhists, after a fashion. Pyrrho was attached to the retinue of 
Alexander the Great during his campaign to India, and is alleged by the Roman 
historian Diogenes Laertius to have met a group pf the so-called 
“gymnosophists,” a word often taken to mean Buddhists or other Indian holy 
men. The affinity between Pyrrhonian skepticism and ancient Buddhism is so 
tantalizing that there seems to be something to this. See 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 
THE LIVES OF THE EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 475 (R.D. Hicks trans., Loeb 
Classical ed. 1995); Richard Stoneman, Naked Philosophers: The Brahmins in 
the Alexander Historians and the Alexander Romance, 115 J. HELENISTIC STUD. 
99, 104-05 (1995). 
110 See SEXTUS, supra note 4, at ix (translator’s preface, noting that “the 
lifeblood of Sceptical practice . . . [is] argument, argument, argument.”). 
111 If the Buddha really was the Buddha, one imagines he would have been more 
like the Siddhartha of Herman Hesse’s novel than the mythological Buddha of 
even Therevada Buddhism. See HERMAN HESSE, SIDDHARTHA (Bantam Reissue 
ed. 1981). 
112 I take this to be, for example, Rorty’s meaning in his distinction between 
“constructive” and “edifying” scholarship. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 357-60 & n.4 (1979). It is also reminiscent of 
Alfred Kazin’s view that “[w]hat gets us closer to a work of art is not 
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 This again seems hard to reject as wrong; I guess my 
response would actually be an aesthetic one rather than a logical 
one. If the purpose is the same as the purpose of art, then most 
legal philosophy (and certainly anything I can imagine writing) 
would look a lot different than it does.113 
 
K. Complete Revision of Our Job Description  
Finally, maybe the thing to do is just stop being law 
professors as traditionally defined. Robert Williams, a self-
identifying “Critical Race Practitioner,” urged such a program. It 
begins with relinquishment of “warped and twisted forms of 
parasitic deviancy plaguing a sick, decaying, and self-absorbed 
society,” including the law professor’s “assigned responsibilities in 
life,”—which are, namely, “to fine-tune the workings of capitalism 
and the Social-Darwinist state by doing doctrinal scholarship about 
the things which . . . enlightened, high-minded fellows . . . care[] 
about intensely, like the efficiency of the mailbox rule.”114 Such a 
catharsis calls for more than “sit[ting] on your ass and 
deconstruct[ing] the world with your word processor.” Rather, 
since one cannot “be a Vampire Law Professor and do Critical 
Race Practice at the same time,”115 the apotheosis apparently 
requires one to stop writing altogether and commit totally to 
teaching (including teaching critical theory) and public service. 
“[R]eaching more people —different types of people—with the 
                                                                                                         
instruction, but another work of art.” ALFRED KAZIN, WRITING WAS 
EVERYTHING 7 (1995). 
113 I have heard an argument on occasion that does not belong here exactly, but 
that is so delicious that I have to get it in somewhere. A believer might say that 
there simply must be some purpose in a writer’s mind when the writer sets out to 
do “philosophy” that is not at all an artist’s purpose, because the work of 
philosophers who are self consciously trying to do philosophy is often 
unbearable to read. Many philosophers for all appearances exert no effort at all 
to make their work enjoyable to read, implying that there must be some purpose 
of their philosophy that is not artistic. One could say that this superficial 
difference reflects a real underlying difference, which is that philosophy is a 
methodological enterprise. That is, philosophy must adopt certain careful 
methods of making distinctions and definitions and so on, because it is thereby 
that it brings us confidently toward truth. Hence the brain-flattening prose. I 
think this argument is pretty simplistic; nothing follows from the fact that a 
philosopher has chosen a particular style. The adoption of a rigorous analytical 
approach in itself just begs a question that the doubter is comfortable answering 
in the negative—whether we humans are in a relation to phenomena that allows 
us to dissect them in this manner of certainties. What is adorable about it is that 
in essence the argument is this: “Chris, your claims must be wrong because so 
much of philosophy is really, really awful.” 
114 Williams, supra note 84, at 757. 
115 Id. at 758. 
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message, . . . that’s what doing Critical Race Practice is all about, 
in [Williams’] mind.”116 
 I would not say that Williams is wrong, exactly; it is just 
that this is not an answer to The Problem. It is a surrender. 
*   *   * 
 I can imagine other purposes like the more subtle ones—
spiritual purposes that do not depend on truth but also are not 
wholly divorced from the content of philosophy. They trouble me, 
however, and I think that they cannot overcome the sense of their 
philosophical incoherence. Roquentin’s new life plan, for example, 
is one that apparently does not call for him to try to be right about 
the world;  his purpose really seems like a dramatically stated 
desire to be famous. The problem with Sextus, on the other hand, 
is that he seems to imply a value. Though the desire for tranquility 
is not necessarily related to the truth of his arguments (indeed, 
Sextus repeatedly reminds us that the skeptic does not claim that 
his beliefs are true, only that they are how the world seems to 
him117), and though desire for tranquility is a self-serving motive 
that is hardly one I would feel bad about adopting, tranquility does 
not explain why Sextus would write—and it is his argumentative 
enterprise that by its nature seems to imply a value. 
 Anyway, I think that one could continue to screw one’s 
brain down on this problem, and continue to read the books upon 
books upon books that might shed light on it. But I think it is time 
to admit that that will not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Maybe 
religious persons, political progressives, and other heroes generally 
are right, and the problem with doubt is merely the absence of 
courage to believe. The evident reality remains that there is no 
better reason to believe one thing than another. I continue to cling 
to my view that skepticism reflects not a lack of courage, but a 
greater capacity for critical self-reflection. 
 
V.   A CONFESSION AND A FAREWELL 
 
 I am pleased to add that making this confession and 
farewell fills me with a great and unexpected relief. This is only a 
little because it frees me of the sometimes icky politics that seem 
to surround gatherings and communities of critical thinkers (and 
left politics as well, interestingly enough118). Indeed, one reason 
                                                
116 Id. at 757. 
117 See, e.g., SEXTUS, supra note 4, at 9. 
118 Witness the crucifixion of Albert Camus, for example, following his break 
with state socialism in the early 1950s. See HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, ALBERT 
CAMUS: A BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1997). The scandal ensued after his publication 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 Jurisprudence Review [March 38 
they turn icky is not that we are bad or dishonest people, it seems 
to me, but that when The Problem is ignored or assumed out of 
existence ours becomes the most naked of emperors. More 
importantly, this confession and farewell ends for now the agony 
of compulsion to argue over something that everyone seems to 
acknowledge has no answer, and the agony of perpetually asking 
my own internal, neurotic philosophical task-master for permission 
to write about things that are completely fascinating. 
 This suggests for now an adoption of something like a 
Quasi-Buddhism or Self-Service and Fun motivation, and takes 
advantage of the only possible sense in which most law professors 
resemble professional basketball players: however inconsequential, 
wrongheaded or aesthetically misguided the endeavor may be, 
producing legal scholarship is nevertheless a craft, which happens 
to be of an essentially literary character. It is a craft at which we 
excel, and as to which a certain community of our fellow 
craftspeople enjoys playing spectator. Thus, an irony that all 
skeptics should love is that perhaps the skeptic can succeed only 
by going silent about skepticism. 
  
                                                                                                         
of The Rebel in 1951, where his central thesis was that revolutionary ideology 
would, in the hands of succeeding dictatorial powers, devolve to intellectual 
formulas and, ultimately, terror. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON 
MAN IN REVOLT (Anthony Bower trans., 1st Vintage ed. 1991) (1951). Though 
The Rebel was not without friends among the non-communist Left, the book and 
Camus were savagely attacked by the communists then dominant among the 
French literati, led most notably by Jean-Paul Sartre. See LOTTMAN, supra. 
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